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LIMITATIONS ON STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN
COMMERCE: THE CONTEMPORARY VITALITY
OF THE HOME-PORT DOCTRINE
The scope of state power to tax interstate and foreign com-
merce presents an enduring and perplexing issue of constitutional
law.1 Even long-honored doctrines are susceptible to judicial re-
examination and rejection, as the Supreme Court has recently
demonstrated.2 The constitutional and policy considerations im-
plicated in this area of the law3 are well illustrated by the judicial
determination of state power to tax personal property used to con-
vey goods and passengers in interstate and foreign commerce.
The home-port doctrine originally limited state power to tax
interstate and foreign instrumentalities of commerce by restricting
such taxation to the corporate domicile of the carrier.4 Following
the development of the home-port doctrine, however, legal prin-
ciples evolved in the context of interstate commerce that established
the validity of ad valorem property taxation on an apportioned
basis.5 With respect to foreign commerce, however, the Supreme
Court has not yet chosen to depart from the home-port doctrine.
Whether the disparate treatment accorded instrumentalities of
interstate and foreign commerce is grounded in principles that con-
tinue to have constitutional validity or is merely a relic of the
I The power of the States to tax and the limitations upon that power
imposed by the Commerce Clause have necessitated a long, continuous
process of judicial adjustment.
The history of this problem is spread over hundreds of volumes of
our Reports. To attempt to harmonize all that has been said in the past
would neither clarify what has gone before nor guide the future.
Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251-52 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.).
2 See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288-89 (1977);
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283, 301 (1976); see notes 59-61 &
136 infra.
3 The due process clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XlV, § 1, the commerce clause,
id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the duty of tonnage clause, id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, the supremacy
clause, id. art. VI, cl. 2, and the treaty power, id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 are all
potentially involved in a challenge to a state's taxation of interstate and foreign
commerce. See text accompanying notes 40-136 infra.
4 See Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471, 479 (1873); Hays v. Pacific
Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596, 599-600 (1855); text accompanying notes
7-39 infra.
5 See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess.,
347 U.S. 590, 600-02 (1954). See also text accompanying notes 26-36 infra.
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law's historic development is an issue of current controversy. This
Comment will discuss the extent to which the home-port doctrine
continues to exempt foreign instrumentalities of commerce from
state property taxation. Part I will review the history and rationale
of the home-port doctrine. Part II will discuss and assess the doc-
trine's proffered constitutional bases. Part III will then present an
analysis that favors the exemption of foreign carriers from state
property taxation when the foreign carrier has been subjected to
full property taxation in its corporate domicile or when the state
has failed to establish a close correlation between the tax liability
and benefits it has conferred upon the instrumentality.
I. THE HOME-PORT DOCTRINE
A. The Home-Port Doctrine in the Context of
Interstate Commerce
The origins of the home-port doctrine are traceable to the
Supreme Court's opinion in Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co3
The State of California had attempted to levy property taxes on a
6 In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571 P.2d 254,
141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977), prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No.
77-1378), the California Supreme Court extended the apportionment principle to
taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce, thereby departing from its earlier
decisions, see, e.g., Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56
Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961), and
severely undercutting the home-port doctrine, see Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. County
of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1979). The court
denied challenges to an apportioned property tax upon shipping containers used
exclusively in foreign commerce, owned by a foreign corporation, and subject to
full taxation in their foreign domicile. During the period in question, Los Angeles
County applied a property tax to the containers approximately equal to 11% of
assessed value. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3 n.2, Japan Line,
Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978)
(No. 77-1378). The assessed value of property ordinarily is equal to 25% of
fair market value. CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 401 (West 1970). At the same time
that the containers were being taxed in California they were also subject to full tax
liability in Japan. Japanese municipalities tax depreciable assets at an annual rate
of 1.4% of market value. In some municipalities the tax rate is somewhat higher,
but may not exceed 2.1%. 1 W. DrAmomN, FOREGN TAx & TAADE BRs, Far East
at 84.7 (1978); T. HAYAsHr, GUIME TO JAPANEsE TAXES 1975-76, at 23-25 (1975).
Foreign carriers, however, are exempt from such taxation. Brief of Amicus Curiae
Aer Lingus et al. at app. 11-13, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, prob.
juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No. 77-1378) (letter from Japanese
embassy to the United States Department of State). On March 24, 1978, the
California State Board of Equalization issued a notice of proposed changes in its
regulations that would amend property tax rule 202 of the California Administrative
Code, 18 Cal. Adm. Code § 202 (1976), to permit apportioned ad valorem property
taxation of aircraft operated solely in foreign commerce. Brief of Amicus Curiae
Aer Lingus et al. at app. 1, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, prob. juris.
postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No. 77-1378).
758 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855).
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ship that was owned, registered, and taxed in New York, but which
was operated in interstate commerce between New York and ports
in California and Oregon. The Court ruled that only the home
port (port of registry) of the vessel could levy such a property tax:
We are satisfied that the State of California had no jur-
isdiction over these vessels for the purpose of taxation;
they were not, properly, abiding within its limits, so as to
become incorporated with the other personal property of
the State; they were there but temporarily, engaged in
lawful trade and commerce, with their situs at the home
port, where the vessels belonged, and where the owners
were liable to be taxed for the capital invested, and where
the taxes had been paid.8
The decision was based principally upon the vessel's lack of taxable
situs in any but the home port.9 In assigning a situs for tax pur-
poses, later cases discarded the port of registry as the controlling
criterion, and focused instead on the domicile of the owner.10
The Hays opinion also indicated that the Court was con-
cerned about state interference with the federal power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce." The Court noted that multiple
taxation of instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce
8 Id. 599-600.
9 In ruling that the home port was the proper and exclusive situs for tax pur-
poses the Court relied upon a federal statute, now codified at 46 U.S.C. § 17
(1970), that required each vessel to be registered at the port nearest the owner's
domicile. Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596, 598 (1855). This
"exclusive situs" rule prevented multiple taxation while assuring that the vessel
would not escape taxation altogether. See Clark, Property Taxation of Foreign
Goods and Enterprises-A Study in Inconsistency, 4 Px ai'anm L. Bxv. 339, 351-52
(1976) [hereinafter cited as A Study in Inconsistency]; Note, State Taxation of
International Air Transportation, 11 STAN. L. REv. 518, 522 n.19 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as Taxation of Aircraft].
10 See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 68 (1911); St. Louis
v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423, 431 (1871), overruled on other grounds, Ott
v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949); Taxation of Aircraft,
supra note 9, at 522 n.19.
The principle that property may be taxed only in the jurisdiction in which it
has acquired a taxable situs derives from the due process clause, U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess.,
347 U.S. 590, 599 (1954). See text accompanying notes 40-51 infra.
"1 And so far as respects the ports and harbors within the United States,
they are entered and cargoes discharged or laden on board, independently
of any control over them, except as it represents such municipal and
sanitary regulations of the local authorities as are not inconsistent with the
constitution and laws of the general government, to which belongs the
regulation of commerce with foreign nations and between the States.
Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596, 599 (1855).
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would occur if it allowed the California tax.12 In addition, the
Court hinted that the vessels were of special federal concern since
they traversed international ocean routes.13
In later cases, the Court relied directly on the commerce
clause 14 to invalidate nondomiciliary state property taxation of
coastal vessels, 15 thus expanding the home-port doctrine beyond its
original character as a situs rule.' These cases indicate that the
Court was uninterested in examining whether the full tax levied by
the home-port jurisdiction corresponded to benefits and protections
afforded the vessel.'
7
Although the home-port doctrine was at first extended to in-
clude vessels engaged in inland river traffic,' 8 it was not extended to
land-based instrumentalities of interstate commerce. In Pullman's
Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania,9 the Court distinguished railroad
rolling stock involved in interstate commerce from ocean-going ves-
sels: whereas ships travel on navigable waters, have a home port,
and touch land only incidentally, rolling stock has no fixed situs
and continuously traverses the various states.20 The Court per-
mitted Pennsylvania's apportionment method of taxation,2 ' but
once again differentiated federal interests in interstate and foreign
12 "[I]t is quite apparent that if the State of California possessed the authority
to impose the tax in question, any other State in the Union, into the ports of which
the vessels entered in the prosecution of their trade and business, might also impose
a like tax." Id.
3 The vessels were "engaged in the business and commerce of the country,
upon the highway of nations, touching at such ports and places as these great
interests demand." Id. 598.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15 "[Ilt is an interference with the commerce of the country not permitted to
the states." Morgan v. Parham, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 471, 479 (1872).
16 A Study in Inconsistency, supra note 9, at 52.
17In Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911), the Court permitted
the state of the owner's domicile to levy a full tax upon a vessel traveling in
interstate commerce, and rejected the argument that a state inaccessible by water
could not be a tax situs, although such a state could not confer services beneficial
to the instrumentality.
18St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1871), overruled on other
grounds, Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
19141 U.S. 18 (1891).
20 Id. 23.
21The mode which the State of Pennsylvania adopted, to ascertain the
proportion of the company's property upon which it should be taxed in
that State, was by taking as a basis of assessment such proportion of the
capital stock of the company as the number of miles over which it ran
cars within the State bore to the whole number of miles, in that and other
States, over which its cars were run. This was a just and equitable
method of assessment . ...
Id. 26.
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commerce: "[T]he vehicles of commerce by water being instru-
ments of intercommunication with other nations, the regulation of
them is assumed by the national legislature." 22 In Ott v. Missis-
sippi Valley Barge Line Co.,2 3 the Court permitted apportioned
taxation of vessels engaged in inland river traffic, holding that for
tax purposes there is no distinction between railroad cars and ves-
sels moving in interstate commerce via exclusively inland water-
ways.24 The Court made clear, however, that its decision was con-
fined to interstate commerce and did not weaken the home-port
doctrine as applied to foreign commerce.
25
The apportionment principle permits nondomiciliary states to
tax a percentage of the value of instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce on the basis of a formula that relates the tax to the use or
presence of the property within the state.26 The state of domicile
likewise may only tax that percentage of the property that cor-
responds to the use or presence of that property within its juris-
diction.27 The chief merit of the apportionment method is that
"interstate commerce can be made to pay its way by bearing a non-
discriminatory share of the tax burden which each State may im-
pose on the activities or property within its borders," 28 while pre-
venting multiple taxation and its subsequent burden on commerce.
The Court extended the apportionment principle to aircraft
engaged in interstate commerce in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska
State Board of Equalization & Assessment, 9 in which it sustained a
state's apportioned ad valorem property tax on aircraft owned by
a corporation domiciled in another state8 0 The Court first re-
22Id. 24.
22336 U.S. 169 (1949).
24 Id. 174-75.
25 Id. 173-74.
26 E.g., id. 174; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U.S. 149, 157
(1900).
27 See Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384-85 (1952).
28Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949) (citation
omitted).
29347 U.S. 590 (1954).
3oExtension of the apportionment method to interstate aircraft was first con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S.
292 (1944), which sustained an unapportioned tax levied by the domiciliary state
on the appellants entire fleet of aircraft. Although the result suggests adherence to
the home-port doctrine, the Court was so divided that no majority opinion could
be written. justice Frankfurter argued in a plurality opinion that the domiciliary
state's power fully to tax the aircraft should not be impaired by the possibility of
taxation in some other state. Id. 295. justice Jackson, concurring in the judgment,
described the apportionment method as a "mongrel one, a cross between desire
not to interfere with state taxation and desire at the same time not utterly to crush
1979]
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sponded to the commerce clause challenge to the apportioned tax,
noting that "the Commerce Clause does not immunize interstate
instrumentalities from all state taxation, but . . .such commerce
may be required to pay a nondiscriminatory share of the tax
burden." 31
In urging the Court to invalidate the apportioned tax on the
ground that the aircraft never attained a taxable situs in the non-
domiciliary state,82 the challengers of the tax analogized their posi-
tion to cases involving ocean-going vessels, relying on Hays in par-
ticular. The Court, however, found a closer analogy "between
planes flying interstate and boats that ply the inland waters," 33 the
latter having been declared taxable on an apportioned basis in
Ott.34 The Court thus held that a state may levy an apportioned
property tax on aircraft engaged in interstate commerce and domi-
ciled in another state, so long as "the tax in practical operation has
relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or
afforded by the taxing State." 35
Braniff represents the culmination of the home-port doctrine's
erosion with respect to interstate commerce. Through supervision
of apportionment formulae by the Supreme Court, the apportion-
ment method is thought to constitute a satisfactory reconciliation
of the states' desire to have interstate commerce "pay its way" 81
and the principle that interstate commerce should not be burdened
with multiple taxation. By specifically rejecting the analogy to
ocean-going vessels in Braniff, the Court left the home-port doc-
out interstate commerce," id. 306, and urged adoption of the home-port doctrine in
the context of interstate commerce. Id. 308. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice
Stone argued for adoption of the apportionment principle. Id.
81 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S.
590, 597-98 (1954) (footnote omitted).
32 The challengers of the tax considered the issue of taxable situs to derive
from the commerce clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, but the Court stated that
"the bare question whether an instrumentality of commerce has tax situs in a state
for the purposes of subjection to a property tax is one of due process." 347 U.S.
at 599 (footnote omitted).
33 Id. 600.
3- See text accompanying notes 23 & 24 supra.
35 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S.
590, 600 (1954) (quoting Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169,
174 (1949)).
36 It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in
interstate commerce from their share of the tax burden even though it increases the
cost of doing business: "'Even interstate business must pay its way,' and the bare
fact that one is carrying on interstate commerce does not relieve him from many
forms of state taxation which add to the cost of his business." Western Live Stock
v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938) (quoting Postal Tele-Cable Co. v.
City of Richmond, 249 U.S. 252, 259 (1919)) (citations omitted).
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trine intact with respect to state taxation of instrumentalities of
foreign commerce.
B. The Home-Port Doctrine in the Context of
Foreign Commerce
State taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce in-
volves several considerations that are not present in the context of
interstate commerce. Whereas the Supreme Court is able to pre-
vent multiple taxation in interstate commerce through supervision
of the apportionment process, a danger of multiple taxation would
remain if states were allowed to tax foreign carriers, because foreign
governments are not bound by the Court's decisions. In addition,
state taxation of foreign commerce may encroach upon foreign rela-
tions, an area subject exclusively to federal power.37
On a practical level, rejection of the home-port doctrine as it
pertains to foreign commerce would likely result in serious interna-
tional repercussions. Since the inception of the home-port doctrine,
the principle of reciprocal exemption from the levy of local prop-
erty taxes and customs duties for instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce has become a widely accepted international practice.38 If
this principle were suddenly rescinded unilaterally by a state, with
or without the Supreme Court's blessing, there is little doubt that
foreign countries would take retaliatory action against American
carriers.8 9
Whether this "foreign" dimension warrants retention of the
home-port doctrine as a matter of constitutional law requires a
careful exploration of the contemporary constitutional viability of
the doctrine. Because much of the original rationale of the doc-
trine has been undercut by subsequent judicial developments, a
3 7See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434-36 (1968) (matters in-
volving foreign relations are entrusted solely to the federal government and states
may not enact legislation creating a potential for disruption of foreign relations);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711-12 (1893) (federal government
is vested with the entire control of foreign relations).
38 Taxation of Aircraft, supra note 9, at 519 n.11.
89 In response to the California Supreme Court's approval of state property
taxation of foreign-owned containers used exclusively in foreign commerce, eight
foreign governments have issued expressions of concern to the United States
Department of State; in response to the California State Board of Equalization's
proposal to levy an apportioned ad valorem property tax upon foreign aircraft, see
note 6 supra, eleven governments have issued formal expressions of concern to the
State Department. Brief for the Appellants at 19-20, Brief of Amicus Curiae Aer
Lingus, et al. at 18, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 21, Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978)
(No. 77-1378). See note 197 infra.
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fresh look at the various constitutional interests is necessary to
determine whether the immunity traditionally enjoyed by instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce remains the most prudent solution
to the problems raised by local property taxation. Furthermore,
any principled decision to retain the home-port doctrine must be
reconciled with the rationale underlying the apportionment method
applied to carriers in interstate commerce.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE
HOME-PORT DOCTRINE
A. Due-Process Doctrine
Because of the nature of a tax as an exaction,40 ad valorem
property taxation of instrumentalities of interstate and foreign com-
merce requires examination under the due process clause.41 The
due process inquiry as formulated by the courts focuses on whether
the taxing jurisdiction has sufficient contact with the carriers-hav-
ing provided benefits, protection, and opportunities-such that the
tax does not constitute a deprivation of property without due
process.4 As put succinctly by Justice Frankfurter in his con-
sideration of a state privilege tax, "[t]he simple but controlling
question is whether the state has given anything for which it can
ask return." 43 The due process issue is alternatively posed as an
examination of "whether an instrumentality of commerce has tax
situs in a state for the purpose of subjection to a property tax." 44
In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board of Equaliza-
tion & Assessment, the Court framed the situs issue as "whether
eighteen stops per day by appellant's aircraft is sufficient con-
tact with [the taxing state] to sustain that state's power to levy
an apportioned ad valorem tax on such aircraft." 45 The Court con-
cluded that "such regular contact is sufficient to establish [the]
4 oWisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 443 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.).
41 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
42 The limitation imposed by the Due Process Clause upon state power to
impose taxes upon such instrumentalities was succinctly stated in the Ott
case: "So far as due process is concerned the only question is whether the
tax in practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or protec-
tion conferred or afforded by the taxing State." 336 U.S., at 174.
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S. 590, 600
(1954) (quoting Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174
(1949)).
43 Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
44 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S.
590, 599 (1954).
45 Id. 600-01.
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power to tax even though the same aircraft do not land every day
and even though none of the aircraft is continuously within the
state." 41
For the carrier that does conduct regular trade within the juris-
diction,47 due process appears to require only that a state property
tax constitute a fair exaction for opportunities, benefits, or protec-
tion conferred by the taxing state.48  Judicial scrutiny of the rela-
tionship between the tax and the benefits actually provided by the
taxing jurisdiction is usually perfunctory, however, and most prop-
erty taxes that make an attempt to apportion the tax on the basis
of the property's presence within the jurisdiction are sustained.
49
Foreign carriers are likely to have contacts with local taxing
jurisdictions that are substantially similar in scope to those of the
interstate carriers in Braniff. It appears, then, that under the
"benefits and protections" approach applied by the Court in Braniff,
state property taxation of foreign aircraft, as well as other instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce,50 does not violate the due process
461d. 601. The Court's language suggests that very irregular or infrequent
contact with a state may exempt a carrier from such taxation under a de minimus
rule, but fails to elucidate the controlling criteria.
In Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11,
363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961), the California
Supreme Court was faced with an attempt to tax foreign aircraft that averaged only
eight round-trip flights per year into the jurisdiction, with an average stay of less
than 34 hours. Id. 16, 363 P.2d at 27, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 27. Although the case
was decided on entirely different grounds, it is dubious whether such minimal con-
tact between a carrier and a state permits even apportioned taxation in accordance
with the due process concept of taxable situs: "the doctrine of apportionment has
neither in theory nor in practice been applied to tax units of interstate commerce
visiting for fractional periods of the taxing year." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 297 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion). See
Taxation of Aircraft, supra note 9, at 521 n.17. See also Braniff Airways, Inc. v.
Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S. 590, 607 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
47 The issue whether an instrumentality of commerce is legally "present" within
a jurisdiction for tax purposes may be surprisingly difficult. In Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No. 77-1378),
for example, the appellant taxpayers argued that because foreign shipping con-
tainers are to be treated as not having entered the United States under federal
regulations, see 19 C.F.R. § 10.41a(a)(1) (1978), they are not present for tax pur-
poses. Brief for the Appellants at 44-45; see Brief for the United States at 25-26.
Contra, Brief for the Appellees at 23.
4 8 See note 42 supra.
49 A Study in Inconsistency, supra note 9, at 49. See text accompanying notes
153-75 infra.
5 0 In particular, state taxation of the shipping containers in Japan Line appears
not to run afoul of due process requirements, because the average stay of the
containers within California was close to three weeks. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County
of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 183-87, 571 P.2d 254, 256, 258-59, 141 Cal. Rptr.
905, 907, 909-10 (1977), prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No. 77-
1378).
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clause.51 The limitations of due process doctrine alone thus cannot
support retention of the home-port doctrine for instrumentalities
of foreign commerce. Whether an apportioned property tax in
fact constitutes a fair exaction for benefits and protection actually
conferred by the taxing jurisdiction will be discussed further below.
B. Commerce-Clause Doctrine
Although state taxation of interstate and foreign commerce
often may in practice affect such commerce as greatly as state regu-
lation, state taxation and regulation of foreign commerce have
always been analyzed differently:
But, when a State proceeds to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, or among the several States, it is exer-
cising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is
doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do.
There is no analogy, then, between the power of taxation
and the power of regulating commerce. 52
The Court consequently has been reluctant to use the commerce
clause 5  to interfere with state taxing measures to more than a
very limited extent.54
Nevertheless, when state taxation discriminates against inter-
state or foreign commerce, there is no question that such taxation
violates the commerce clause.55 Of course, the existence of dis-
crimination may be difficult to prove, and its sufficiency to invali-
date a state tax may depend on a variety of factors:
[A]lthough a tax purports to treat interstate and local
commerce equally, the existence of discrimination actu-
51 The original "exclusive situs" rationale of the home-port doctrine, see text
accompanying notes 7-10 supra, consequently appears to have been fatally under-
mined. See Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d
11, 44, 363 P.2d 25, 45, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 45, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961)
(Traynor, J., dissenting).
52 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 (1824).
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54 The Court early found that the clause impliedly prohibits state regulation
of "national" subjects, and applied a related doctrine to bar taxing measures
deemed to impede free trade among the states. . . . Hesitance to interfere
with more than a very limited category of state taxing measures has
become particularly marked in recent years ....
Developments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate
Business, 75 HAItv. L. REv. 953, 956 (1962) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited
as Developments].
55 See, e.g., Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
405 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1972); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373
U.S. 64, 69-70 (1963); Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 424-25 (1946).
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ally depends on such matters as the scope of competition,
the relation among all the various taxes paid in the taxing
state by foreign and local competitors, and possible justifi-
cations for treating such competitors differently for tax
purposes.56
When nondiscriminatory state taxation is involved, determina-
tion of whether the tax involves an undue burden on commerce
is complex. Because the Court at first interpreted the commerce
clause as a charter to maintain "free trade" in interstate and foreign
commerce, interstate businesses were granted a broad cloak of im-
munity from state taxation. 57  Over the years, however, the scope
of this tax immunity has been greatly narrowed. 8 In Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,"9 the Court eliminated the immunity
of interstate business from state taxes levied upon the "privilege"
of doing business within the state,60 clearly indicating that the
commerce clause does not bar a tax that is "applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly apportioned,
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly
related to services provided by the State." 61
Consistent with these principles, the Braniff Court upheld an
apportioned state property tax levied upon aircraft engaged in
interstate commerce. 62  Before concluding that Braniff forecloses
any commerce clause challenge to nondiscriminatory apportioned
property taxes levied upon instrumentalities of foreign commerce,
S5 Developments, supra note 54, at 694; see R. PosNEB, ECONOMIC ArALYsis
oF LAw 512-14 (2d ed. 1977).
57 See, e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946) ("Nor is there any
warrant in the constitutional principles heretofore applied by this Court to support
the notion that a State may be allowed one single-tax-worth of direct interference
with the free flow of commerce.").
58 See generally Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358
U.S. 450, 457-61 (1959) (upholding an apportioned state income tax levied upon
an out-of-state corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce within the
taxing state). See also Colonial Pipelines, Inc. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108-12
(1975).
59430 U.S. 274 (1977).
60 The Court overruled Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602
(1951).
61Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). One
observer suggests that after Complete Auto Transit the level of protection afforded
interstate commerce "has been reduced from an impregnable zone of immunity to
essentially a guarantee of nondiscriminatory treatment." Hellerstein, State Taxation
and the Supreme Court: Toward a More Unified Approach to Constitutional Adjudi-
cation?, 75 Micm L. REv. 1426, 1448 (1977) [hereinafter cited as A More Unified
Approach].
62 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S.
590, 597-98 (1954).
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it is necessary to assess the significance of the distinguishing char-
acteristics of interstate and foreign commerce.
1. The Problem of Multiple Taxation
In considering state taxation of interstate and foreign com-
merce, particularly instrumentalities of such commerce, a primary
focus of analysis under the commerce clause has been the problem
of actual or potential taxation by several jurisdictions. Multiple
taxation places interstate or foreign commerce at a disadvantage
because intrastate activities do not bear the same burden. Further-
more, "even if there are no local competitors and so no discrimina-
tion in the ordinary sense, duplicative taxation remains inimical to
the open economy because it places a financial premium on con-
fining operations to one or a few states, thus discouraging multi-
state operations." '3 Of course, the same holds true for encum-
brances on foreign commerce.
The apportionment principle applied by the Court to prevent
multiple burdens on interstate commerce does not completely re-
solve the difficulties, because the various states levying a tax on an
apportioned basis may utilize different formulae, each choosing
the method most advantageous to itself.64 Nonetheless, the Court
believes that adherence to the apportionment principle is a satis-
factory resolution of the multiple burdens problem in regard to
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.65
In the context of foreign commerce, a widely held view is that
apportionment does not provide a satisfactory solution because "it
is apparent that the apportioned basis of taxation is unworkable
because the courts of this country can exercise no control over the
foreign taxing authorities." 66 Thus, even when a state levies only
an apportioned tax upon an instrumentality of foreign commerce,
a multiple tax burden may arise should the foreign country decide
to levy a full ad valorem tax.6 7 Accordingly, courts have concluded
63 Developments, supra note 54, at 964. See generally Barrett, State Taxation
of Interstate Commere-"'Direct Burdens," "Multiple Burdens," or What Have
You?, 4 VAm. L. REv. 496 (1951). For a broader assessment of the aggregate
economic impact of multiple taxation, see B. HEPSmE, MonEN PuBLIc FINANCE:
Tim SUnY or PuBLic SECToR EcoNolzncS 318-20 (rev. ed. 1971); B. MusCRAVE,
TiE THEORY or PuBLIc FiNANcE 179-80 (1959).
64 For a discussion of how such manipulation occurs with respect to state
income taxation of foreign corporations, see R. PossNE, supra note 56, at 515-16.
65 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S.
590, 598 (1954).
66 Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 32,
363 P.2d 25, 38, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 38, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).67 In SAS, for example, California attempted to levy an apportioned property
tax on foreign aircraft that were taxed, on an unapportioned basis, in their home
port. Id. 17 n.3, 363 P.2d at 28 n.3, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 28 n.3.
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that the matter of property taxation of instrumentalities of foreign
commerce is an exclusively federal concern, so as to foreclose appor-
tioned state taxation.68 In the absence of congressional action, con-
tinued application of the home-port doctrine is thought by many
to be the most viable judicial response to the shortcomings of the
apportionment method in the foreign context.69
This point of view, however, has not been endorsed by all who
have considered the problem. In Scandinavian Airlines System,
Inc. v. County of Los Angeles ("SAS"), 70 Justice Traynor, in dissent,
viewed the issue simply as "whether there is discrimination against
foreign commerce." 71 He dismissed the problem of unapportioned
taxation by foreign countries as
erroneously attribut[ing] to such taxation the risk of dis-
crimination. Actually it is attributable to the freedom
of foreign countries, not permitted to our own states, to
adopt rules of their own that can result in multiple
burdens. The Court cannot prevent foreign countries
from taxing instrumentalities of foreign commerce owned
by their domiciliaries even if those instrumentalities are
permanently located here, just as it cannot prevent foreign
countries from taxing American aircraft temporarily
abroad even though they have been taxed at full value
at the domicile of their owners here.... It does not follow
that the states must forego the power to impose taxes that
are not in themselves discriminatory.... Congress remains
free to prohibit altogether state taxation of instrumental-
ities of foreign commerce.
72
The logic of Justice Traynor's dissent was eventually adopted
by the California Supreme Court in Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. County
of Alameda,73 in which it was held that a state could levy an ap-
portioned ad valorem property tax on cargo shipping containers
used mainly in foreign commerce but owned by a shipping com-
pany domiciled in another state. In approving the tax, the court
Likewise, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571
P.2d 254, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977), prob. luris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978)
(No. 77-1378), California sought to levy a full ad valorem property tax on shipping
containers already fully taxed in Japan. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
68 Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 32,
363 P.2d 25, 38, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 38, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
69 Id. 32-34, 363 P.2d at 37-39, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 37-39.
70 Id. 11, 363 P.2d at 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
71'd. 44, 363 P.2d at 45, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
72 Id. 44-45, 363 P.2d at 45, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
73 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974).
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relied upon Justice Traynor's SAS analysis to reject the theory that
the tax was impermissible because multiple taxation might result
due to judicial inability to exercise control over foreign taxing au-
thorities.74
This argument constitutes a challenging attack upon the entire
framework for analyzing multiple burdens in foreign commerce.
Justice Traynor's focus on discrimination may be too narrow, how-
ever, because even nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce may
have to yield when they present a serious impediment to the con-
duct of commerce.75 An apportioned ad valorem property tax may,
in practical operation, place an undesirable financial premium on
the conduct of foreign commerce,70 thereby contravening the basic
policies underlying the commerce clause.
77
In addition, although the Sea-Land court conceded that appor-
tionment among nations is a matter of international agreement,
78 it
74 [T]he threat of double taxation from foreign taxing authorities has no
role in commerce clause considerations of multiple burdens. Indeed, it is
gratuitous to suggest that a state is alleviating any threat of multiple bur-
dens by limiting its own taxing power, when foreign nations may tax instru-
mentalities of commerce that touch their jurisdiction at any rate they
choose. The commerce clause mandates apportionment among the several
states in order to avoid discriminatory burdens on interstate or foreign
commerce. But apportionment among nations is a matter of international
agreement; it should not be considered as a limitation on a state's power
to tax.
Id. 788, 528 P.2d at 67, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
75 Under the "free-trade" interpretation of the commerce clause, see text ac-
companying note 57 supra, this proposition is easily established. Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946). More recently, however, because the free-trade prin-
ciple has been greatly eroded, see text accompanying notes 58-61 supra, the non-
discrimination criterion has been given great emphasis. However,
the Court [has] not exalt[ed] the nondiscrimination principle into the exclu-
sive criterion by which the constitutionality of state taxes would be deter-
mined .... Complete Auto Transit [, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)]
does not disturb the requirements that the taxed enterprise have some nexus
with the taxing state and that the tax be fairly apportioned to the
acivities carried on there.
A More Unified Approach, supra note 61, at 1447. It is not self-evident that the
latter requirement of fair apportionment is satisfied when a foreign carrier is sub-
jected to an ad valorem property tax when the carrier has already paid a full ad
valorem tax elsewhere.
76 It may be that the absence of any authoritative tribunal with the ca-
pacity to ensure that the aggregation of taxes is not computed on more than
full value dictates that the interest of a state in taxing international air
carriers on a parity with purely national airlines be sacrificed, lest inter-
national air operations be substantially impaired.
Developments, supra note 54, at 986.
77 For similar analyses made in the context of interstate commerce, see Inter-
national Harvester Co. v. Department of the Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 358 (1944)
(Rutledge, J., concurring); text accompanying note 63 supra.
78 See note 74 supra.
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did not consider whether this feature of the multiple taxation prob-
lem awards exclusively to the federal government the power to tax
foreign instrumentalities. If the imposition of property taxes upon
instrumentalities of foreign commerce is properly a subject of inter-
national agreement, it may be that apportioned state taxation of
such instrumentalities is prohibited even when Congress has not
acted: "complete power over international affairs is in the national
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or
interference on the part of the several states .... In respect of all
international negotiations and compacts, and in respect of our
foreign relations generally, state lines disappear." 79
Application of the home-port doctrine appears to remedy the
problem of multiple taxation, 0 because each instrumentality of
foreign commerce would be subject at most to a single full ad
valorem tax-that levied by its home domicile. Such a solution
unfortunately seems inconsistent with the Braniff principle that
tax liability should be apportioned commensurately with the bene-
fits, protection, and opportunities afforded the carriers by the taxing
jurisdiction.81
2. Congressional Power Under the Commerce Clause
Whereas the federal power to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce may preclude any form of state regulation,8 2 in the
absence of congressional action the commerce clause clearly does
not prohibit nondiscriminatory state taxation of carriers operating
in interstate commerce.88  It has been suggested, however, that in
some circumstances the prohibitive reach of the commerce clause
may be greater when foreign commerce is concerned:
The records of the Constitutional Convention are
unclear as to whether the negative implications of Con-
gress's power over foreign commerce are broader than those
inherent in Congress's power over interstate commerce.
79 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (emphasis added).
s0 As a matter of authority, the Supreme Court's original concern with multiple
taxation in the foreign context, see Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.)
596 (1855), was not allayed by later decisions approving apportioned taxation in
the interstate context. See text accompanying notes 12 & 25 supra.
81 See note 42 supra & accompanying text.
s82 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).
83 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S.
590, 597-98 (1954); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 581-82 (1847)
(Taney, C.J.).
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While the framers expressed greater concern for establish-
ing congressional regulation of foreign than of interstate
commerce, there is no other indication that the correlative
limitations on state power were meant to be different. Al-
though the Supreme Court has not satisfactorily resolved
the issue, dicta in several cases suggest that the prohibitions
of the foreign commerce power are stronger, since for-
eign commerce is more clearly a matter of national con-
cern.84
Such a constitutional principle would help justify the disparate
treatment of interstate carriers under the apportionment principle
and foreign carriers under the home-port doctrine, because the im-
munity of the latter from state property taxation could be said to
stem from the greater reach of the commerce clause vis-4-vis foreign
commerce. 81
84 Taxation of Aircraft, supra note 9 ,at 525-26 (footnotes omitted).
85 The suggestion that Congress's dormant commerce power may preclude state
taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce presupposes that Congress may,
by actually exercising its power, prohibit such taxation. This view is supported by
the decision in McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940), in which the
Supreme Court held that a New York sales tax on imported goods was invalidated by
a congressional regulation that exempted the goods from such taxation:
It is evident that the purpose of the Congressional regulation of the com-
merce would fail if the state were free at any stage of the transaction to
impose a tax which would lessen the competitive advantage conferred on
the importer by Congress. . . . The state tax in the circumstances must
fail as an infringement of the Congressional regulation of the commerce.
Id. 429 (footnote omitted). The Court's decision may be inconsistent with its
early interpretations of the commerce clause, see The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504, 581-82 (1847) (Taney, C.J.), and it has been urged that McGoldrick
be confined narrowly to its facts. A Study in Inconsistency, supra note 9, at 75.
There are strong indications, however, that state property taxation of instrumentalities
of interstate and foreign commerce may be expressly prohibited by Congress:
"Congress has not extended its protection and 'control to the field of taxation,
although I take it no one denies that constitutionally it may do so. It may exact a
single uniform federal tax on the property or the business to the exclusion of
taxation by the states." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 303-04
(1944) (Jackson, J., concurring). See Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County
of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 44, 363 P.2d 25, 45, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 45, cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
This power of Congress is especially noteworthy because it implies that local
jurisdictions may be unable to recover the costs of benefits and services rendered to
interstate and foreign commerce, even when due process requirements are satisfied.
See Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946). But see Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) ("privilege of doing business" tax not per se
unconstitutional when applied to interstate commerce). Moreover, the proposition
that local jurisdictions occasionally may be required to shoulder the burden of
federal policy in foreign affairs through constraints on their taxing powers has
previously been considered by commentators. Cf. Note, The Immunity of Foreign
Consulate Property from Real Property Taxation: United States v. Glen Cove, 38
ALa. L. REv. 976 (1974) (criticizing immunity of foreign consulates from local real
property taxation).
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Given the limitations on Supreme Court scrutiny, such a solu-
tion is appealing. When taxation of interstate commerce is con-
cerned, the supervisory role of the Court ensures that no state is
grievously affected by unilateral taxing decisions of any other state.
When foreign commerce is concerned, however, unilateral action
by a single state in levying a property tax on foreign instrumental-
ities of commerce may trigger a response by foreign nations, re-
taliatory or otherwise, that would affect the nation as a whole.86
The proposition that congressional power over foreign com-
merce is greater than its power over interstate commerce, and that
such power invalidates nondiscriminatory state taxation of instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce-even when Congress has not acted
-unfortunately constitutes too flimsy a foundation upon which to
base a constitutionally sound doctrine.8 7 The Constitution does
not provide strong textual support for the distinction,8 nor would
such a solution satisfactorily explain the divergence from the "bene-
fits" rationale of Braniff.89
A more sensible approach is simply to recognize that congres-
sional power to regulate both interstate and foreign commerce is
complete,90 but that the effect of Congress's dormant commerce
power as applied to interstate and foreign commerce may differ, for
the problems presented by each differ. Thus, although the commerce
power of Congress may be uniform, when the factors considered
by courts differ as between interstate and foreign commerce, dif-
ferent rules may apply91
86 "If [the United States] should get into a difficulty which would lead to war,
or to suspension of intercourse, would California alone suffer, or all the Union?"
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279 (1876).
87 Constitutional and judicial support for the proposition that the reach of the
commerce clause is greater when applied to foreign commerce than when applied to
domestic interstate commerce is weak. See Taxation of Aircraft, supra note 9, at
525-26 & nn.29-30. Moreover, it is difficult to articulate a principled basis for
determining the scope of this greater dormant commerce power in the context of
foreign commerce.
88 U.S. CoNsr. art. -L § 8, cl. 3.
89 See notes 42, 47 & 48 supra & accompanying text
9o A Study in Inconsistency, supra note 9, at 44 n.22.
91 State property taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce may be a
case in which rules used in the interstate context should not apply. Apportionment
provides a complete solution to the problem of multiple taxation for interstate com-
merce, but not for foreign commerce. In addition, taxation of foreign commerce
may well encroach on the federal power to conduct foreign affairs. See text accom-
panying notes 93-116 infra. The Court therefore needs to develop another
principled method of assessing the validity of state property taxation of instru-
mentalities of foreign commerce.
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3. The Dormant Commerce Power and Federal Exclusivity
The dormant commerce power, as we have seen above, was
apparently used by the SAS court to justify continued adherence
to the home-port doctrine because of the spectre of multiple taxa-
tion.92 To some extent, this approach is consistent with traditional
dormant commerce power analysis. 93  In many respects, foreign
commerce requires uniformity that can be achieved only through
exclusive federal regulation.94
The SAS court, however, seemed also to rely on a principle
of federal exclusivity related to, but distinct from, the dormant com-
merce power:
[T]axation of foreign owned and based instruments of
commerce represents a field that is peculiarly federal in
nature, without regard to each specific constitutional con-
siderations as the commerce clause or the due process
clause, and which must be left to the administration of
the federal government, even in the absence of any present
federal legislation thereon.95
Later California cases seemed to recognize this distinction between
the commerce power and federal exclusivity." Although the source
of this principle of federal exclusivity is obscure, it seems to rest in
part upon the exclusive federal power to conduct foreign affairs.
9
T
92 See note 68 supra & accompanying text.
93 "Whatever subjects of . . . [the commerce] power are in their nature
national, or admit only of one . . . plan of regulation, may justly be said to be
of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress." Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). See L. TamE, AmucAN
CoNsitrnoNAL L.w 369-70 (1978).
94 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445-49 (1827). See also
Philadelphia & So. S.S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 346-47 (1887); Chy Lung
v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 279-80 (1876); The Case of the State Freight Tax, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873).
95 Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 42,
363 P.2d 25, 43, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 43, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
96 In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 186, 571
P.2d 254, 258, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905, 909 (1977), prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955
(1978) (No. 77-1378), the court declared that "Sea-Land is fully dispositive of the
commerce clause and federal exclusivity issues raised in the case at bench."
97"[Ilnstrumentalities of communication with other nations comprise a field
which admits of but one uniform system of regulation, which by its very nature
must be exclusively federal.... ." Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of
Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 30-31, 363 P.2d 25, 36, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 36, cert. denied,
368 U.S. 899 (1961). See note 13 supra & accompanying text. In Japan Line, Ltd.
v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571 P.2d 254, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977),
prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No. 77-1378), the amicus curiae
airlines argued on appeal that the action of Los Angeles county in taxing shipping
containers used in foreign commerce and owned abroad "constitutes a clear trespass
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There is no question that power to conduct foreign affairs is
vested in the federal government, 98 and the Supreme Court has
indicated that this power is exclusive.99 Accordingly, the Court has
invalidated state legislation that intrudes upon the paramount power
of the federal government to conduct foreign affairs. 00
A strong case can be made that state property taxation of in-
strumentalities of foreign commerce is a prohibited interference
with the federal government's conduct of foreign affairs.101 The
United States is a party to international agreements affecting vari-
ous instrumentalities of commerce, including shipping containers ' 0 2
and aircraft,103 that seek to minimize the incidence of multiple
taxation and eliminate other tax burdens on international trade.104
on the paramount power of the federal government to conduct the external affairs
of the United States." Brief for Amicus Curiae Aer Lingus, et al. at 9-10, prob.
juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No. 77-1378).
98Although the Court has consistently recognized the power of the federal
government to regulate foreign affairs, the constitutional source of the power is
difficult to identify. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958), overruled on other
grounds, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). See generally Henkin, The Treaty Makers
and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L.
REv. 903 (1959); Logfren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973).
99 "Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested
exclusively in the national government." United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324,
330 (1937). See note 37 supra & accompanying text.
100In United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), a bank deposit account
of a Russian corporation was held to be the property of the United States by virtue
of an international compact, despite any conflicting state policy. See also United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). In Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968),
an Oregon probate law was struck down because of its clear intrusion into foreign
affairs:
The practice of state courts in withholding remittances to legatees residing
in Communist countries or in preventing them from assigning them is
notorious. The several States, of course, have traditionally regulated the
descent and distribution of estates. But those regulations must give way
if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation's foreign policy.
Id. 440 (footnotes omitted).
101 This position was taken by the amicus curiae airlines in Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No. 77-1378).
Brief of Amicus Curiae Aer Lingus, et al. at 9-19.
102 Customs Convention on Containers, May 18, 1956, [19691 20 U.S.T. 301,
T.I.A.S. No. 6634, 338 U.N.T.S. 103.
103 Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 59 Stat.
1516, E.A.S. No. 469, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. (International Civil Aviation Organization,
Council Resolution I, November 1966.)
10 4 See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United
States and Japan, Oct. 30, 1953, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863. Although it is
unclear whether these treaties actually exempt foreign instrumentalities of commerce
from state property taxation, particularly in the case of containers, they do indicate
that the federal government is active in negotiating with foreign nations the scope
of tax immunity of such instrumentalities. This observation may suggest that pre-
emption analysis is appropriate: "When Congress or a federal agency has established
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The prospect that state property taxation will disturb foreign trad-
ing partners, 0 5 upsetting reliance on a settled course of practice 106
and possibly provoking retaliation by foreign governments, 07 is
quite real. Because such state taxation is likely to have "a direct
impact upon foreign nations and may well adversely affect the power
of the central government" 108 to deal with the pressures of inter-
national tax liability, federal exclusivity in foreign affairs may re-
quire the states to refrain from levying property taxes upon foreign
instrumentalities of commerce.
Indeed, the Supreme Court appears subtly to have endorsed
the home-port doctrine on federal exclusivity grounds. In uphold-
ing a state "business and occupation" tax levied upon stevedoring
operations, 109 the Court noted that "the tax does not restrain the
ability of the Federal Government to conduct foreign policy ...
No foreign business or vessel is taxed. Respondents, therefore,
have demonstrated no impediment posed by the tax upon the regu-
lation of foreign trade by the United States." 110
Nevertheless, the prospective success of any attempt to justify
the home-port doctrine solely on federal exclusivity grounds is not
assured. In Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, l the Court upheld
a state harbor-use tax, noting that "charges levied by state authority
to defray the cost of regulation or of facilities afforded in aid of
interstate or foreign commerce have consistently been held to be
permissible." 112 Since property taxes are purportedly payments
for benefits and protection rendered to the carrier under Braniff's
a complex scheme that appears to cover all possible aspects of a given area, the
courts have inferred a congressional intent to occupy the entire field to the exclusion
of the states." Comment, Preemption Doctrine in the Environmental Context: A
Unified Method of Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. BEv. 197, 206 (1978) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter cited as Environmental Context]. But see Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947). This Comment, however, does not focus on
the preemption issues involved in state taxation of foreign instrumentalities of com-
merce. See text accompanying notes 117-123 infra.
10 5 See note 39 supra.
'
0 6 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2441, 2449 (1978)
(longstanding tax principles upon which foreign tax systems and private expectations
have relied should not lightly be disturbed).
107 Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11,
42-43, 363 P.2d 25, 44, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 44, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961).
See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21
(1963); note 86 supra.
108 Zschering v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968).
1 0 9 Department of Revenue v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734
(1978).
110 Id. 754 (emphasis added).
"'l296 U.S. 261 (1935).
112 Id. 267 (emphasis added).
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analysis, Clyde Mallory suggests that such a tax on a foreign instru-
mentality of commerce is not objectionable on the ground of fed-
eral exclusivity, because even foreign commerce should "pay its
way."
Moreover, the Court has elsewhere adopted a restrictive view
of the immunity from state taxation derived from federal exclusiv-
ity. In upholding a nondiscriminatory state property tax levied
upon imported goods against a challenge based upon the import-
export clause,113 the Court quickly disposed of the federal exclusiv-
ity issue:
It is obvious that such nondiscriminatory property
taxation [of imported goods] can have no impact whatso-
ever on the Federal Government's exclusive regulation of
foreign commerce. . . . By definition, such a tax does
not fall on imports as such because of their place of origin.
It cannot be used to create special protective tariffs ...
and it cannot be applied selectively to encourage or dis-
courage any importation in a manner inconsistent with
federal regulation." 4
Although the Court's treatment of the issue is casual115 and may
not be determinative of the corresponding issue in the context of
state property taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce,"x6
the Court does seem inclined to a narrow application of the fed-
eral exclusivity principle when the state taxing power is concerned.
C. The Treaty Power and Preemption Doctrine
Challenges to state property taxation of interstate and foreign
commerce frequently involve the contention that such taxation di-
rectly contravenes federal regulations or national treaty obligations,
and is consequently invalid under the supremacy clause."2' Even
when state action does not conflict with an express congressional
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
114 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 286 (1976).
115 While the Court is on firm enough ground in making what amounts to
little more than a tautological assertion that a nondiscriminatory tax does
not have characteristics of a discriminatory tax, it is not altogether clear
why it is so "obvious" that a nondiscriminatory state tax can have "no
impact whatsoever" on the federal government's exclusive regulation of
foreign commerce.
Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages: Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports,
1976 Sup. CT. BEv. 99, 108 [hereinafter cited as Enhanced State Power].
116 See text accompanying note 110 supra.
117 "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land ..
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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enactment, the Court has articulated a preemption doctrine, usu-
ally grounded in the supremacy clause, that invalidates state laws
that are inconsistent with congressional purposes or that encroach
upon "a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject." 118 Accordingly, in the context of state
taxation of foreign commerce preemption analysis is closely tied to
the Court's treatment of federal commerce and foreign affairs
powers. State action may also be preempted by treaties with
foreign nations." 9
Any preemption analysis is complicated by the doctrine's hazy
contours 120 and the need to evaluate and interpret specific statu-
tory and treaty provisions. Because each form of interstate and
foreign commerce has a different set of regulations and treaties
associated with it, and because each may involve different nations
to whom varying treaty commitments have been made, preemption
analysis provides at best a piecemeal approach to the problem. Al-
though the courts generally have not been very receptive to pre-
emption attacks upon state property taxation of various instrumen-
talities of commerce, 1 2 1 these attacks persist 122 and may succeed
118 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
119 E.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (preventing Missouri from
interfering with the enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act).
120 See generally Environmental Context, supra note 104; Note, The Preemption
Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 CoLumT. L.
REv. 623 (1975); Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959).
121 In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347
U.S. 590 (1954), the Court held that apportioned property taxation of interstate
aircraft was not preempted by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 973
(1938) (currently codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970 & Supp. V, 1975)),
certain provisions of which, id. § 1107 (i) (3), 49 U.S.C. § 1508(a), declared exclu-
sive national sovereignty in the airspace above the United States. 347 U.S. at 594-97.
In Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363
P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961), the California Supreme
Court, although likewise holding that existing federal regulations did not preempt
state property taxation of foreign aircraft, found the international treaties involved
to be more troublesome. (In invalidating the taxes, the court did not specifically
rely on preemption issues.) Id. 37-42, 363 P.2d at 40-44, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 40-44.
In Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d 772, 528 P.2d 56, 117
Cal. Rptr. 448 (1974), the California Supreme Court found that neither federal
regulation of container traffie in international commerce nor treaty agreements be-
tween the United States and foreign parties preempted an apportioned state property
tax on containers moving in foreign commerce but owned in the United States. Id.
787, 528 P.2d at 66-67, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 458-59. A similar result was reached
in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 188-89, 571 P.2d
254, 259-60, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905, 910-11 (1977), prob. iuris, postponed, 436 U.S.
955 (1978) (No. 77-1378), involving an ad valorem tax levied upon containers
engaged exclusively in foreign commerce and owned abroad.
122 See Brief for the Appellants at 28-35, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, prob. furls. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No. 77-1378); notes 102-04
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under appropriate circumstances. If the Court were to sustain a
preemption challenge to a state taxation statute affecting foreign
instrumentalities of commerce, however, the inherent narrowness
of such a preemption decision would probably shed little light on
the broader question of the home-port doctrine's current constitu-
tional viability2
3
D. Duty of Tonnage Clause Doctrine
The Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall, without the
Consent of the Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage." 24 A non-
discriminatory ad valorem property tax does not literally fall within
this prohibition. A property tax is not dependent upon the ca-
pacity of the carrier's instrumentality.125 Nonetheless, judicial
interpretation of the duty of tonnage clause reaches beyond the
narrow scope of the constitutional language, relates both to inter-
state and foreign commerce, 26 and can further elucidate whether
legal justifications exist for exempting foreign instrumentalities
from state property taxation.
Although the literal terms of the duty of tonnage clause pro-
hibit only taxes measured by the capacity of a carrier, it has been
given a broader application in accord with its original purpose of
supplementing the import-export clause 127 to prevent indirect state
taxation of imports: "If the states had been left free to tax the privi-
lege of access by vessels to their harbors the prohibition against
duties on imports and exports could have been nullified by taxing
the vessels transporting the merchandise." 128 Accordingly, the
clause has been interpreted to prohibit all types of taxes that do
supra. Cf. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707 (1972) (one dollar airport use charge on each emplaning passenger not
preempted by any congressional action or declaration).
123 The breadth of the holding in preemption cases is ordinarily restricted by
the particular federal and state statutes upon which the preemption analysis is based.
See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (provisions of Wash-
ington's Tanker Law, WAsI. REv. CoDE ANr. §§ 88.16.170-.190 (Supp. 1977), pre-
empted by Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1227 (1976)
and 46 U.S.C. § 391a (Supp. V 1975), and 46 U.S.C. §§ 215 & 364 (1970)).
124 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
125 See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 265 (1935) (to the
constitutional framers, "tonnage" meant internal cubic capacity of a vessel).
120 The duty of tonnage clause applies to interstate commerce, as well as to
foreign commerce. The State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 213-14
(1871).
127 See note 136 infra.
128 Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 265 (1935). See Packet
Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 85 (1877); Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 31, 34-35 (1867).
1979]
840 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
not bear a relationship to "benefits" conferred129 A property tax
levied upon vessels owned by residents, however, is not within the
clause's prohibition, because such a tax need not be construed as
a duty for the privilege of using the harbor.130 There appears to
be no reason why the duty of tonnage clause and its associated prin-
ciples should not be applied to instrumentalities of commerce be-
sides ocean-going vessels, such as aircraft and shipping containers. 18 1
It has been suggested that a nondiscriminatory property tax
levied upon an instrumentality of foreign commerce can be con-
strued as a tax for the privilege of using port facilities 132 and thus
be considered as falling within the prohibition of the duty of ton-
nage clause. In fact, the SAS court relied partly on the duty of
tonnage clause to uphold the home-port doctrine:
While valuation may be used as a basis for taxing an instru-
mentality of commerce when the owner is a resident, or
when the instrumentality has otherwise acquired a tax-
able situs, the power to so tax is based upon the right to
tax the person upon his financial investment .... If the
charge attempted to be imposed is one which, by the terms
of the statute or ordinance imposing it, may become due
from an instrumentality of foreign commerce without any
services being rendered to it, or without the enjoyment of
special benefits, and from the mere fact that it has arrived
in a port of the state, it is a charge on tonnage, and there-
fore not collectible .... There is no logical reason why
the stated principles should apply only if the proposed tax
is based upon the gross tonnage of a vessel, and be in-
applicable if the same tax is based upon the vessel's
value.138
129 [Tihe prohibition against tonnage duties has been deemed to embrace
all taxes and duties regardless of their name or form, and even though not
measured by the tonnage of the vessel, which operate to impose a charge
for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port.... But it does
not extend to charges made by state authority, even though graduated
according to tonnage, for services rendered to and enjoyed by the vessel
Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1935) (citations omitted).
See also Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 84-85 (1877).
130 Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 279-80, 283-84 (1879); The
State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 213 (1871).
'3' Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944). See
Taxation of Aircraft, supra note 9, at 532.
132 Id. 532 n.52.
'33 Scandinavian Airlines Sys., Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 56 Cal. 2d 11,
35, 363 P.2d 25, 39-40, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 39-40, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 899 (1961)
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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The thrust of this argument is that a nondiscriminatory prop-
erty tax on instrumentalities of foreign commerce is not a satisfac-
tory quid pro quo for benefits conferred by the taxing jurisdiction,
but rather-in the terms of the tonnage clause-operates "to impose
a charge for the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a
port." '" This conclusion is dubious, however, because Supreme
Court decisions in the context of interstate commerce have upheld
such taxes,n and because no distinction is made between interstate
and foreign commerce for the purposes of tonnage clause analysis.
Although the duty of tonnage clause presents perhaps the most ex-
plicit constitutional command that instrumentalities of commerce
not be subjected to local taxes other than those related to benefits
and services rendered, the Court's record in applying the clause to
interstate commerce provides little support for the exemption of
foreign carriers from state property taxation under the home-port
doctrine.138
134 Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1935) (citations
omitted). See note 129 supra & accompanying text.
135 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S.
590 (1954); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
136 In addition to the prohibition contained in the duty of tonnage clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, the Constitution provides that "[n]o state shall, without
the consent of the congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on imports or exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws:' Id. cl. 2.
The import-export clause was interpreted to prohibit state nondiscriminatory property
taxation of imported goods until the goods lost their character as imports and became
incorporated into the mass of property in the state. E.g., Low v. Austin, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 29 (1872). This rule effectuated the intent of the constitutional
framers that favorably situated states be "prohibited from levying taxes on citizens
of other States by taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to the other States
not situated as favorably geographically." Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276, 285-86 (1976) (footnote omitted). Although instrumentalities of commerce
are not goods and hence would not fall within the literal terms of the import-export
clause, commentators have suggested that the import-export clause supports, by
analogy, the proposition that instrumentalities of foreign commerce should not be
subjected to property taxation by geographically favored states. See, e.g., Taxation
of Aircraft, supra note 9, at 531-32.
Two recent cases, however, have shifted the import-export clause inquiry from
a determination whether goods have lost their character as imports to an exam-
ination whether the state tax constitutes a prohibited "Import or Duty" on the
imported goods. See Department of Revenue v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring
Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 751-57 (1978); Michelin, 423 U.S. at 279, 290-94. In Wash-
ington Stevedoring the Court reasoned that a state tax on stevedoring operations was
unrelated to the value of goods and hence was not a prohibited "Import or Duty."
435 U.S. at 755-57. Responding to the argument that the Washington tax imposed
a transit fee upon inland consumers and the importer, the Court asserted that
"Iflair taxation will be assured by the prohibition on discrimination and the require-
ments of apportionment, nexus, and reasonable relationship between tax and
benefits." Id. 761. Hence, unless the importer can show a relationship between
the value of the goods imported and the amount of property taxation, it is unlikely
that the import-export clause could serve as direct support for exempting foreign
instrumentalities of commerce from local property taxes.
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III. POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RETENTION OF THE
HOME-PoRT DOCTRINE
The constitutional considerations discussed in the previous
section do not provide compelling support for retention of the
home-port doctrine in the context of state property taxation of for-
eign instrumentalities of commerce. Indeed, within the relevant
constitutional doctrineg the principle that commerce should "pay
its way" plays a recurring role.137 Critics of the home-port doc-
trine contend that the exemption of foreign instrumentalities from
local property tax liability conflicts with the "pay your way" prin-
ciple138 and accords preferential treatment to foreign carriers.
There are, on the other hand, a number of countervailing factors
that militate in favor of retaining the home-port doctrine; chief
among them are the problems of multiple tax burdens and state
interference with federal exclusivity over foreign affairs.
Given the tension between these two positions, resolving the
question of local property tax immunity for foreign instrumental-
ities appears, on first impression, to entail a decision as to which
set of competing considerations should be paramount. Because
recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that the Court is placing
increased emphasis on the principle that commerce, both inter-
state' 3 9 and foreign,140 should "pay its way" the future vitality of
the home-port doctrine seems imperiled.
The following analysis suggests that the Court is not faced with
a one-or-the-other choice between constitutional alternatives, be-
cause the home-port doctrine need not be interpreted as incon-
sistent with the principle that commerce should "pay its way."
Rather, the Court should approach the problem by examining
whether, in view of the constitutionally cognizable distinguishing
characteristics of interstate as opposed to foreign commerce, a non-
discriminatory ad valorem tax levied upon instrumentalities of
foreign commerce is actually an appropriate "quid pro quo for
benefits actually conferred by the taxing State." 141
l3 See text accompanying notes 42-43 (due process doctrine), 61 (commerce
clause doctrine), 129 (duty of tonnage clause doctrine) & 136 (import-export clause
doctrine) supra.
138 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 185, 571 P.2d
254, 257, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905, 908 (1977) prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955
(1978) (No. 77-1378); Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. County of Alameda, 12 Cal. 3d
772, 786, 528 P.2d 56, 66, 117 Cal. Rptr. 448, 458 (1974); A Study in Inconsistency,
supra note 9, at 54-55, 60-61 (1976). See also note 151 supra.
139 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 284 (1977).
140 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 287 (1976).
41Id. 289. See also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977) (tax should be "fairly related to the services provided by the State");
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A. When Does Commerce "Pay Its Way"?
In asserting that interstate and foreign commerce should "pay
their way" the Court has repeatedly indicated that state taxes will
be validated only insofar as they are fairly related to benefits con-
ferred upon the taxpayer by the taxing jurisdiction.142 The Court's
language in expressing the "fair relation" 143 principle is not with-
out ambiguity because the principle can be interpreted as restricting
the state taxing power either to direct user charges for specific
benefits rendered to the taxpayer, or more broadly to the collection
of no more than a "fair share" of the overall tax burden. 44
In the context of state taxation of instrumentalities of inter-
state and foreign commerce, the standard of tax/benefit correlation
used by the judiciary in applying the "fair relation" principle is of
some consequence. Interstate and foreign carriers usually pay a
variety of charges to defray the costs of port facilities that they use.
Shipping containers may thus be required to pay dockage and wharf-
age charges, 145 while aircraft may be required to pay landing and
structure use fees.146 Alternatively, if carriers are to be required to
shoulder a "fair share" of the overall tax burden, they will be pay-
ing both for public goods provided by the state, of which the level
of individual consumption can not be computed, 147 and public
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S. 590, 600
(1954) ("the tax in practical operation . . . [should have a] relation to oppor-
tunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded by the taxing State") (quoting
Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949)).
142 Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S.
590, 600 (1949).
143 See text accompanying note 61 supra.
144 The Court has recognized the different character of user-charge and general
revenue taxes. See, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S.
336, 341-42 (1978); Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 197-98
(1893); Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 85 (1877).
145 Strictly speaking, the owner of the vessel bearing the containers is required
to pay the dockage charges for the privilege of mooring the vessel, while the owner
of the cargo passing through the harbor is required to pay the wharfage charge for
goods passing over the wharf. See Brief for the Appellants at 8, Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No. 77-1378).
14 6 Airport costs may be recovered by alternative charges, such as airport use
taxes imposed upon emplaning passengers. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth.
Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 714 (1972). See also International Air
Transportation Fair Competitive Practices Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. § 1159a (1970);
Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1718(5) & (8) (1970).
147Public goods are collectively consumed goods that cannot be provided
through the price system because there is no way to prevent a citizen who does not
pay for the good from consuming it. National defense is the archetypal example
of a pure public good. Because of the nature of collective consumption it is
ordinarily impossible congruently to allocate the benefits and costs of public goods
to individual taxpayers. Mushkin & Bird, Public Prices: An Overview, in PunLIc
Pmczs FoR PuBLIc PaoDucTs 23 (S. Mushlkin ed. 1972); Developments, supra note
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services the benefits of which accrue principally to other taxpayers.1 48
In a recent case, for example, revenues collected from the chal-
lenged California property tax would be expended on relatively
pure public goods such as flood control and mosquito abatement,149
from which the instrumentalities of commerce would benefit,150 as
well as on the costs of financing the local school system, the bene-
fits of which accrue principally to enrolled children and their
families.:18
The distinction between direct user charges and a general reve-
nue exaction is critical in determining the scope of state power to
tax instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce, because
the amount of tax liability is substantially different under the
alternative methods of taxation. It is thus crucial to determine
which standard of tax/benefit correlation the Court has adopted in
assessing whether a tax "is fairly related to services provided." 152
54, at 957. The existence of public goods accounts for the limited usefulness of
user charges and, more generally, the benefits principle of taxation, as a fiscal
instrument. B. HmnmB, supra note 63, at 122-23.
348 The state may pursue distributional goals through the tax system. See
R. PosNa, supra note 56, at 509.
149 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S.
955 (1978) (No. 77-1378). The County of Los Angeles issued a notice of assess-
ment to the taxpayers, which listed the various tax agencies entitled to receive a
portion of the property tax revenue:
Taxing Agency Rate (%)
Los Angeles 2.5157
County 4.0882
Unified Schools 4.7952
Junior College .4489
Flood Control .3552
Water Replenish[ment] .0012
Water Agencies .1700
Mosquito Abate[ment] .0057
Total 12.3801
Brief for the Appellants at 7, id.
150 Brief for the Appellees at 18-20, id.; Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Cali-
fornia at 8, id.
151 Although the benefits of education accrue chiefly to children and their
families, there are undeniably significant "spillover effects" that may benefit the
owner of instrumentalities of foreign commerce. The owner, for example, may rely
upon the local school system to produce an educated workforce. Brief for the
Appellees at 21, id.; Brief of Arnicus Curiae State of California at 8, id. Concededly,
there are few cases of "pure" public or private goods. Yet "an economic good whose
benefits are largely divisible under the application of the exclusion principle, and/or
whose marginal production costs do not approach zero, may validly be termed a
quasi-private good." B. HuanF, supra note 63, at 257. Because expenditures on
education seem to fit within this mold, school finance seems difficult to characterize
as a predominantly public good. See Katzman, Pricing Primary and Secondary
Education, in Puinac PucEs Fon PuBLic PRonucTs 371 (S. Mushkin ed. 1972).
152 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). See
note 141 supra.
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B. Correlating a Tax to Benefits
The Supreme Court's approach to the problem of relating a
tax to benefits has not been consistent. Early cases framed the
issue in terms of a direct user charge: only those taxes on instru-
mentalities of interstate or foreign commerce that corresponded to
fees for specific benefits or services rendered would be sustained.
Thus, in Steamship Co. v. Portwardens,153 the Court invalidated a
state tax levied upon vessels arriving in its ports for the benefit of
the port's masters and wardens, whether or not any services were
performed. Notably, the Court rejected the contention that the
mere availability of the services these men provided was a suffi-
cient basis for the tax and required that services actually be utilized
to justify imposition of the tax. 54 Nor was the Court reluctant to
scrutinize the relationship between the tax and expenses incurred
by the state:
To justify the exaction by a state of a money payment
burdening interstate commerce, it must affirmatively ap-
pear that it is demanded as reimbursement for the ex-
penses of providing facilities, or of enforcing regulations
of the commerce which are within its constitutional
power.... This may appear from the statute itself... or
from the use of the money collected, to defray such
expense. 55
Judicial scrutiny gradually became more perfunctory, although
the Court continued to enunciate the requirement that tax levies
on interstate and foreign commerce correspond to services rendered.
In Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama,56 the Court upheld a state
harbor fee levied on vessels despite the lack of any specific services
rendered.' 57 The decline in the level of judicial scrutiny of the
tax/benefit relationship was more pronounced: the Court announced
that "[t]he classification of the traffic for the purposes of regulation
15373 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867).
154 See Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1877); Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
155 Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290, 294-95 (1937) (emphasis added). See also
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 182 (1940); Interstate
Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183, 186 (1931); Sprout v. South Bend, 277
U.S. 163, 169 (1928).
156 296 U.S. 261 (1935).
157 The Court distinguished Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
31 (1867), by observing that "[t]he benefits which flow from the enforcement of
regulations . . . to protect and facilitate traffic in a busy harbor inure to all who
enter it." 296 U.S. at 266.
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and fixing fees is a legislative, not a judicial, function." 158 Further-
more, a lenient standard of tax/benefit correlation was adopted: "If
the fees charged do not appear to be manifestly disproportionate to
the services rendered, we cannot say from our own knowledge or
experience that they are excessive." 159
In several cases involving interstate commerce, the Court indi-
cated that it was moving further away from the concept of a strict
user charge, and would approve virtually all taxes that represented
a "fair share" of the overall tax burden.1 0
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court have reverted to user-
charge language in evaluating the validity of state taxes levied upon
interstate and foreign commerce in their varied forms.' In
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc.,1 2 for example, the Court approved a one dollar "use
and service charge" for each emplaning passenger at a local air-
port, viewing the tax as a valid user charge:
At least so long as the toll is based on some fair approxi-
mation of use or privilege for use . . . and is neither dis-
criminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive in
comparison with the governmental benefit conferred, it
will pass constitutional muster, even though some other
formula might reflect more exactly the relative use of the
state facilities by individual users.0 8
In an analogous context the Court upheld a federal registration tax
levied upon a state-owned helicopter, stating that "[a] government
body has an obvious interest in making those who specifically bene-
fit from its services pay the cost . ..provided that the charge is
structured to compensate the government for the benefit con-
ferred." 164
158 Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 594 (1939).
159 Id. 599.
160 A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies . . . if by the practical
operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to oppor-
tunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits
which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, cioilized society.
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940) (emphasis added). See
also Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S. 590,
597-98 (1954); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938).
161 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978); Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 289 (1976); Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport
Auth. Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972). See also Colonial Pipeline
Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
162405 U.S. 707 (1972).
163 Id. 716-17.
164 Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 462 (1978).
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If scrutiny of the states' correlation of services and taxes be-
comes too perfunctory, judicial application of the user-charge
principle and the concomitant prohibition of general exactions for
the local welfare 165 loses all force: a state could simply assert that
a particular tax is tied to benefits rendered without any fear of
judicial invalidation. Earlier cases upholding many different kinds
of taxes, although utilizing user-charge language, actually departed
so far from the usual meaning given to user charges as to suggest
that the user-charge principle had been substantially, although not
completely, diluted. 6 This approach has been repeated in at
least two recent decisions.
167
The Court's current approach to the tax/benefit correlation
problem is well illustrated by Massachusetts v. United States,'6 in
which the Court upheld an annual aircraft registration tax levied
by the federal government upon a state-owned helicopter over state
objections that (1) a flat annual fee is not directly related to the
degree of use of the airways, and (2) that any user tax should be
closely calibrated by the Court to the amount of the taxpayer's
actual use, at least in the context of state tax immunity. 09 In
answering the state's first objection the Court concluded that al-
though the federal government did not "own" the airways, sub-
stantial benefits were provided by the federal government, thus
justifying the imposition of a taxY.70  The Court responded to the
state's concern that it would pay more than its actual "fair share"
by noting that the flat fee would, as likely as not, exact "less money
from the State than it would have to pay under a perfect user fee
system." 171 In addition, the Court suggested that precise calibration
of use and charges would actually increase the cost to the state be-
cause of high administrative expenses. 72 In the final analysis, how-
165 "A state's generalized need for revenue, while a rationale for taxing, is not
by itself an argument for the imposition of any particular tax [upon interstate com-
merce]. This revenue interest must therefore be further specified in order to link
taxation with the specific activity taxed." L. TamE, supra note 93, at 346. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 462-63 (1978) (dictum); Freeman v.
Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946); Taxation of Aircraft, supra note 9, at 536.
166 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461-62,
465 (1959); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542, 544-47 (1950); Aero
Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R.R. Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 505-06 (1947).
167 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); Colonial Pipe-
line Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975).
168435 U.S. 444 (1978).
169 Id. 463-64.
170 Id. 463 n.19.
71Id. 466.
172 Id.
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ever, the Court concluded that a slight overcharge was simply not
constitutionally offensive.17
3
The Court laid down a three-pronged test to resolve the tax/
benefit correlation problem: even taxes such as flat fees would be
upheld so long as they (1) are nondiscriminatory, (2) are based upon
some fair approximation of use, and (3) are not shown to be exces-
sive in relation to the cost to the government of the benefits con-
ferred.174 The lenient approach 17 5 utilized in Massachusetts v.
United States suggests that the Court, although continuing to espouse
the user-charge principle, will ordinarily approve general revenue
exactions levied upon instrumentalities of interstate commerce so
long as the tax satisfies broad (but unspecified) "fairness" require-
ments.
C. The Property Tax as a User Charge 1,T
Neither economic theory'177 nor empirical evidence lends sub-
stantial support to the suggestion that an ad valorem property tax
corresponds, even roughly, to a user charge for benefits or services
rendered: "[I]n a nonagricultural economy the property tax is a
poor index of both the public services received by households and
businesses and the economic status, or ability to pay, of the tax-
payer." 17 As a matter of logic, a tax based upon the value of per-
sonal property bears little relation to benefits or services rendered
to the taxpayer..79 For instance, under an ad valorem tax, an older
173Id.
174 Id. 466-67. See Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth. Dist. v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 716-20 (1972).
175 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, dissented on the ground
that the Court had not afforded the state the opportunity to show that the fee was
not, in fact, a user fee: "I cannot . . . accept as a substitute for such factual
findings House and Senate Reports which merely state that a tax of this kind is
'generally viewed as a user charge."' Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,
474 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This view indicates that closer adherence
to the user-charge principle has some judicial support.
176 In what follows it is assumed that the property taxes are deposited in the
state treasury as general revenues. If these revenues were deposited in an earmarked
fund, such as a port trust fund, the weight of Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Auth.
Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972) and Massachusetts v. United
States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978), would suggest that the tax would be acceptable as a
user charge.
177For a theoretical discussion of the conditions under which an ad valorem
property tax corresponds to a user charge, see Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. PoiarcAL ECoN. 416 (1956).
178 H. AARoN, WHao PAYS THE PROPERTY TAxP 1 (1975). See also D. NaT=zE,
EcoNoMIcs OF Tm POThoPxn TAx 59-60 (1966).
179 Property taxation also fails to meet the test of the benefits-received
principle of tax equity. The payment of property taxes does not follow,
in most instances, a quid pro quo relationship with the benefits received
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aircraft would pay less than a newer aircraft, although both utilize
the same services.
The Court has viewed the relationship differently-at least in
regard to instrumentalities of interstate commerce-repeatedly stat-
ing that ad valorem property taxation "in practical operation has
relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or
afforded by the taxing state." 180 These pronouncements, however,
have seldom been accompanied by any serious analysis of the re-
lationship between the amount of taxation and the benefits con-
ferred.'18 Nevertheless, the disparity between the Supreme Court's
apparent justification of apportioned property taxation as a quid
pro quo (rather than as a general revenue exaction) and economic
reality' 8 2 indicates a degree of judicial ambivalence between result
and rationale.
8 3
Not surprisingly, this same ambivalence appears to have been
extended by the Court to foreign commerce. In Michelin Tire
Corp. v. Wages,84 for example, the Court used user-charge language
from the consumption of governmentally provided economic goods financed
through the taxes. A childless couple, for example, will pay school property
taxes on an identical basis with a couple who [sic] has several children to be
educated. Moreover, fire and police protection usually does not correlate
closely with the assessed value of property and the taxes paid on that
property.. . . Indeed, distributional equity in the bearing of tax burdens
tends to be approached irrationally by the property tax whether viewed in
terms of the ability-to-pay or the benefits-received bench mark.
B. HFER, supra note 63, at 238-39 (emphasis in original).
It might be argued that a general revenue property tax can be justified on the
ground that the carrier benefits from being provided with an orderly market. See
note 160 supra. This reasoning, however, would almost completely eviscerate the
requirement that taxes upon interstate and foreign commerce-and carriers in
particular-will be sustained only so long as there is a fair relationship between the
tax and benefits conferred, since virtually any tax might be said to be an exaction
for the largely unquantifiable benefits of an orderly society.
1 80 Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 174 (1949). See
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347 U.S. 590, 600
(1954); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1938).
Of course, earlier cases suggest the opposite conclusion. E.g., Interstate Transit,
Inc. v. Lindsey, 238 U.S. 183, 190 (1931).
181 In Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equaliz. & Assess., 347
U.S. 590 (1954), for example, such tax/benefit analysis was avoided because
Braniff did not challenge the reasonableness of the state's apportionment of the tax
burden among taxable entities within the state. Id. 598. In dealing with other
challenged taxes, the Court has not felt obliged to perform any sort of calibration
analysis unless the issue was raised by the challenger. Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278, 287 (1977).
182 "[I]n the case of carriers which are only temporarily within the state,
imposition of the general property tax, even on an apportioned basis, bears little
factual relation to the benefits actually conferred." Taxation of Aircraft, supra note
9, at 535.
183 See text following note 175 supra.
184 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
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to uphold a state property tax levied upon imported goods as a
"quid pro quo for benefits actually conferred by the taxing state." 11
However, Michelin's approval of ad valorem property taxes levied
upon imported goods was significantly more qualified than its ap-
proval of similar taxes levied upon instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.ls 6 The Court's continued proscription of taxes on prop-
erty merely "in transit" through a state l87 suggested concern about
possible multiple tax burdens, while elsewhere the Court hinted
that state taxes upon imports may, under certain circumstances,
impermissibly interfere with federal exclusivity over foreign
affairs.' 8
8
D. The Property Tax and Instrumentalities
of Foreign Commerce
In determining whether to extend apportioned ad valorem prop-
erty taxation to instrumentalities of foreign commerce, the Supreme
Court will have the opportunity to face economic realities 189 and
acknowledge that such taxation is in no meaningful sense tied
to specific benefits and protection conferred by the taxing jurisdic-
tion. Once this is done, the Court must select the standard of
tax/benefit correlation by which it will evaluate property taxation
of instrumentalities of foreign commerce. A narrow, strict user-
charge interpretation of the principle that foreign commerce must
"pay its way" would not be inconsistent with the home-port doc-
trine so long as the state could still levy bona fide user charges upon
instrumentalities of foreign commerce. 190
The chief obstacle to such an interpretation, of course, is that
the Court has repeatedly validated general revenue property taxes
185 Id. 289. The Court viewed property taxes as
taxes by which a State apportions the cost of such services as police and
fire protection among the beneficiaries according to their respective wealth.
[Ultimate consumers should pay for such services as police and fire
protection accorded the goods just as much as they should pay trans-
portation costs associated with those goods.
Id. 287, 289. The Court thus justified the property tax by reference to both the
"ability-to-pay" and "benefits" principles of taxation, despite the conventional
economic wisdom to the contrary. See note 179 supra.
18 6 See note 136 supra.
-187Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 290 (1976); see Enhanced
State Power, supra note 115, at 122-26.
18 8 See text accompanying note 110 supra. But see text accompanying note 114
supra.
18 9 See note 202 infra.
190 States are permitted to, and do, levy a broad range of direct user charges
upon instrumentalities of interstate and foreign commerce. See notes 145-46 supra.
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levied upon instrumentalities of interstate commerce. The proper
approach, then, must be to consider whether the distinguishing
characteristics of interstate and foreign commerce make the nar-
rower interpretation of the principle that commerce should "pay its
way" more appropriate when applied to foreign carriers.
A number of factors suggest that the narrower interpretation
is more appropriate when instrumentalities of foreign commerce
are involved. Consider first the problem of multiple taxation.1 91
Interstate carriers subjected to general revenue property taxes are
assured of paying no more than a single full ad valorem property
tax because of the Court's supervisory role in the apportionment
process. Accordingly, whether or not a particular state tax is cor-
related closely with specific benefits and services conferred by the
taxing jurisdiction, or constitutes a "fair share" of the overall tax
burden, is relatively inconsequential to the interstate carrier be-
cause there is a rough upper bound on the total tax that must be
paid. 92 The same is not true of instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce, because they are already subject to user charges in each
jurisdiction they enter, while actually or potentially incurring a full
ad valorem property tax in their home port. 93 In this light, it
becomes more important to ensure that taxes levied upon foreign
carriers are bona fide user charges, because such carriers cannot avail
themselves of the same judicial safeguards against excessive taxation
as can interstate carriers. Thus, an apportioned general revenue
property tax may be an acceptable quid pro quo as applied to
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, but is inappropriate when
applied to foreign instrumentalities.
Moreover, the principle of federal exclusivity over foreign af-
fairs weighs in favor of adopting the narrower version of the princi-
ple that commerce should "pay its way" in the foreign context.
When a state taxes an instrumentality of commerce according to the
user charge principle, it acts like a private vendor of services. For-
eign carriers can hardly expect immunity from charges for specific
benefits and services rendered. When a state levies a general reve-
191 See text accompanying notes 63-81 supra.
192 Because apportionment formulae and tax rates vary among the states, there
will be some significance to the interstate carrier as to its tax liability in each state,
and the "upper bound" will not be a precise figure.
193 Many nations levy full ad valorem property taxes on their carriers, including
(in the case of aircraft) Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Mexico, the
Netherlands, and Japan. Brief of Amicus Curiae Aer Lingus et al. at App. II,
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955
(1978) (No. 77-1378) (letters to the Department of State from respective
embassies).
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nue tax upon an instrumentality of commerce, however, it asserts its
sovereignty over the carrier 9 4 by exacting contributions accord-
ing to the state's distributional goals and notions of tax equity.195
Because foreign nations are not likely to believe that their carriers
have a justifiable duty to further state distributional policies or to
subsidize services that benefit them only remotely,196 such a tax
creates a strong threat of foreign retaliation (or other adverse re-
action) that, if realized, would probably disrupt the federal govern-
ment's trading relations with the other nation. 97 Thus, exercise
of state sovereignty over an instrumentality of foreign commerce
in the form of a general property tax represents a greater intrusion
into the exclusive power of the federal government to conduct for-
eign affairs than does a direct user charge.
The contention that foreign carriers should be liable only for
direct user charges while interstate carriers are subject to appor-
tioned general revenue property taxation is likely to meet with the
objection that foreign commerce is unjustifiably granted preferen-
tial treatment. 9 8 From the perspective of the foreign carrier sub-
ject to a full ad valorem tax in its home port, however, the
immunity from state property taxation in the United States does
not constitute preferential treatment, but rather prevents a multi-
194See, e.g., Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 85 (1877) (duty of tonnage
clause proscribes taxes based on sovereignty, but not an exaction demanded as
compensation for services rendered by the state in its capacity as a proprietor).
195 Economists generally consider property taxation to be regressive in practical
operation. B. HEnBnE, supra note 63, at 238-39; D. NET=ZE, supra note 178, at
46-47. A recent analysis has questioned this conclusion, finding instead that
property taxation (of real property) may be "one of the more progressive elements
in the national tax system rather than one of the most regressive." H. AAoN, supra
note 178, at 93.
196 See note 151 supra & accompanying text.
197 In a letter to the Solicitor General, the Department of State advised that
"[wlhile foreign countries, and their political subdivisions, do not now impose
property taxes on U.S. containers or flag carriers, we cannot discount the possibility
that such taxes will be imposed in retaliation if the California tax is upheld." Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at App. C, 18a-19a, Japan Line, Ltd. v.
County of Los Angeles, prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978) (No. 77-1378).
The possibility of foreign retaliation appears to be more than mere speculation.
In a move not directly connected with the California Supreme Court's Japan Line
decision, the European Economic Community (EEC) decided in June, 1978, to
study suitable countermeasures to take against non-member states whose practices
are detrimental to the maritime interests of member states. 1978 Burr.. EUroPEAN
Coamrutnns, No. 6, at 54 (1978); Brief for the Appellants at 20, 436 U.S., supra.
Furthermore, since the laws of West Germany grant exemption from property taxa-
tion only on the basis of reciprocity, state taxation of West German containers will
be followed automatically by the imposition of property taxes upon American
containers in West German ports. Brief for the Appellants at 20, 436 U.S., supra.
See also note 39 supra and notes 101-08 supra & accompanying text.
19 8 See A Study in Inconsistency, supra note 9, at 58.
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ple tax burden. As long as the total tax burdens borne by dif-
ferent carriers are comparable, neither interstate nor foreign com-
merce will achieve a competitive advantage due to application of
the home-port doctrine.199 Furthermore, as long as the foreign
carrier pays a fairly complete set of direct user charges, user-charge
payments will account for nearly all of the additional costs in-
curred by the state by virtue of the foreign carriers' operations.2°0
These considerations suggest the conclusions that (1) when the
foreign carrier has been subjected to full property taxation by its
sovereign, the home-port doctrine should be applied so as to im-
munize the carrier from state general revenue property taxation,
and (2) when the carrier's sovereign has imposed no such tax, the
Supreme Court should require the state to establish a close rela-
tionship between the tax revenue contributed and the benefits
conferred before allowing the foreign instrumentality of commerce
to be subject to the state property tax.
IV. CONCLUSION
Early cases applying the home-port doctrine indicated that the
Supreme Court was relatively unconcerned with correlating tax
liability with benefits rendered pursuant to the principle that all
commerce should "pay its way"-an approach that today provides
the touchstone for constitutional analysis of state power to tax inter-
state and foreign commerce. In addition, the home-port doctrine
was formulated at a time when the apportionment method of taxa-
tion was not yet developed. The rationale of Hays v. Pacific Mail
Steamship Co.201 consequently seems anachronistic, but exemp-
tion from state property taxation, which instrumentalities of foreign
commerce enjoy under the home-port doctrine, may well remain the
most prudent solution to the peculiar problems posed by such
taxation.
199 In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. 3d 180, 571 P.2d
254, 141 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1977), prob. juris. postponed, 436 U.S. 955 (1978)
(No. 77-1378), for example, the California tax on containers was levied at an
annual rate approximately equal to 2.75% of market value, while Japanese containers
are taxed at home at annual rates ranging from 1.4-2.1% of market value. See note 6
supra.
2 00 So long as the state collects a full range of user charges, the unrecompensed
marginal cost to the state of the foreign carrier's operations will be close to zero.
Of course, whenever the state's tax base is restricted the tax burden of other tax-
payers must increase correspondingly. Such is the price of reconciling the pro-
hibition against multiple tax burdens and state interference with federal power to
conduct foreign affairs with the principle that commerce should "pay its way." See
note 85 supra.
20158 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855).
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This Comment presents an analysis that favors substantial re-
tention of the home-port doctrine with regard to foreign instrumen-
talities of commerce, using a contemporary constitutional frame-
work. Although several of the doctrine's original constitutional
underpinnings have been substantially eroded by developments in
the context of interstate commerce, when foreign commerce is in-
volved the possibility of multiple tax burdens and state interference
with the nation's external affairs deserves continued judicial atten-
tion. Consequently, in determining the current vitality of the
doctrine, the Court should be more attentive to the general prin-
ciple that state taxation of foreign commerce must be related to
benefits and services rendered to the taxpayer. One appealing way
of accommodating these considerations with the principle that all
commerce should "pay its way" would be to exempt from state
property taxation foreign carriers already subject to full property
taxation by their sovereigns, but to continue to subject them to
direct user charges for specific benefits and services rendered by the
state and its political subdivisions. Because a state's general reve-
nue property tax may well have international repercussions and
thus may interfere with the federal government's exclusive power
to conduct foreign affairs, even when a foreign carrier's sovereign
has not levied an ad valorem tax upon its instrumentalities of com-
merce the courts should validate only those state property taxes
that correspond closely to the level of direct benefits and services
rendered.
But the method of analyzing the validity of state property taxes
is more important than results in particular cases. The Court must
face up to the discrepancy between the user-charge language it has
employed in validating many types of state taxes and the economic
reality 202 that such taxes are usually general revenue exactions un-
related to the level of public services consumed by individual tax-
payers. Once this distinction is acknowledged by the Court, a
principled articulation of standards should lend more clarity and
consistency to the complex questions of state taxing power.
202 In recent cases involving state taxing power over interstate and foreign
commerce the Court has emphasized "economic realities." Department of Revenue
v. Ass'n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 752 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring
in part and in the result); Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279
(1977). As Professor Tribe notes, however, "[ilt seems possible . . . that the
Court's 'new realism' will be largely a one-way ratchet, and that the Court will
resist formalism only when it erodes state taxing power." L. Tn=a, supra note 93,
at 361 n.5.
[Vol. 12,7:81"/
